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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by rms that pro-
duce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We nd
out that integration is privately protable for a high enough degree of product
di¤erentiation, that prots of the non-integrated rms decrease, and that con-
sumer surplus need not necessarily increase when rms integrate despite the
fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving
for a high enough degree of product di¤erentiation combined with a mini-
mum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from
a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be
anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some
circumstances.
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1 Introduction
There are many industries where rms produce complementary products or compo-
nents. Indeed, the nal goods from which consumers derive utility are obtained from
the combination of such complementary products into a composite good or system.
Examples include automatic teller machines (ATMs) and bankcards, an airline trav-
eller that uses two di¤erent airlines on a one-stop itinerary, personal computers and
software, transportation and hotel services, manufacturing and distribution activi-
ties and so on. This paper examines the strategic incentives to integration by rms
that produce complementary products when composite goods (or systems) are (dif-
ferentiated) substitutes for one another both from a private and a social viewpoint.
When products are complements, an additional incentive for bundling arises. We
will also look into the potential anti-competitive e¤ects of bundling behavior.
As a motivating example, and to illustrate the interest of our analysis, consider
the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell. Although there are
quite a number of elements at play, this integration process has got the special fea-
ture of bringing complements together along with bundling issues.1 The European
Commission expressed serious concerns by arguing that General Electric had a domi-
nant position in aircraft engines whereas Honeywell had a leading position in aircraft
systems; the Commission claimed that the proposed merger would allow the new
rm to bundle these complementary products and that, on the whole, this would
lead to market dominance. Integration of complementary goods and the theory of
bundling can be traced as far back as Cournot (1838). However, as Nalebu¤ (2002)
himself puts it, the Cournot model - where the producer of copper and the producer
of zinc integrate into one rm to make brass - does not consider the impact of the
merger on any other rms in the market. As a rst approximation to the issues
involved, we assume that rms play the following two-stage game. In the rst stage,
1Concentration may occur through mergers, takeovers, acquisitions and integration. These
terms all describe situations where independently owned rms join together under the same own-
ership. Our analysis does neither consider mergers between competitors (horizontal mergers) nor
mergers between rms operating at successive stages of the production process (vertical mergers).
Although some authors talk about a conglomerate merger in cases where complementary products
are involved, we will rather refer in the sequel to integration of complementary products to better
account for the specic relationship that a consumer combines the two products together. It is
also more natural when integration carries the use of bundling pricing.
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rms that produce system (or composite good) 1 and rms that produce system
(or composite good) 2 decide simultaneously and independently whether to inte-
grate or not. We may then have three di¤erent scenarios: independent ownership,
single integration and parallel integration (when both systems integrate). In stage
two, given the inherited outcome from the rst stage, rms set prices; in case of
integration, the rms will engage in bundling pricing. The following questions then
raise: Is it a prot-maximizing strategy for producers of complementary goods to
integrate when faced with a di¤erentiated system whose producers can also respond
with integration? If so, what are the welfare implications? What happens to prots
of outsider rms? How are results related with bundling practices?
The pioneering paper by Salant et al. (1983) initiated an extensive literature on
exogenous mergers. These authors, in a setting with strategic substitutes, suggested
the idea that prots of the merged rms need not increase unless the merger includes
a sizeable number of rms in the industry, that prots of outsiders increase and that
welfare goes down. In fact, Salant et al. (1983) focused on the strategic competition
e¤ect of an exogenous merger by dispensing with any e¢ ciency cost e¤ects. On the
other hand, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have shown that exogenous mergers are
always privately protable with strategic complements; outsidersprots increase
and welfare decreases. As noted by Gaudet and Salant (1992a), who survey some
important contributions on horizontal mergers, a merger under price competition
and perfect complements is much similar to a merger with quantity competition
and perfect substitutes yet with a signicant change: it will increase social welfare.2
We wish to extend previous work on price competition with complementary products
(where each product is produced by one and a di¤erent rm) by introducing rivalry
from a competing composite good, to address the possible concerns of bundling in
such a setting, and to endogenize the merger decision in order to answer the ques-
tions posed above.
Although there are some papers that have dealt with endogenous mergers, an
analysis like the one herein developed seems, to the best of our knowledge, not to
have been undertaken. Kamien and Zang (1990) rst formulated a two-stage game
2Further, Gaudet and Salant (1992b) have shown that mergers may be privately unprotable
if some members of the industry do not participate in the merger agreement.
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where the merger decision is endogenized.3 Apart from other modeling assump-
tions they focus on quantity competition with homogeneous products and instead
we assume price competition with complementary products. The model that we
propose also touches on the issue of bundling, a pricing possibility when integration
occurs.4 Relevant contributions on competition among complementary components
of composite goods include Economides and Salop (1992) and Matutes and Reg-
ibeau (1992). The former provides an extensive analysis of complementary systems
to analyze the e¤ect on prices of alternative market structures. However, they nei-
ther examine whether producers of complementary products nd it protable to
integrate nor the welfare implications. The latter considers a duopoly where each
rm makes two components of a system but again the integration decision is not
an issue. Firms rst decide about compatibility and then about marketing strate-
gies: to price the components separately (pure component pricing), to sell them as
a system (pure bundling) or do both (mixed bundling). In contrast, we assume that
each component is produced by a di¤erent rm and that the systems are potentially
asymmetric in terms of market size. Thus, if rms are non integrated then the mar-
keting strategy will be one of pure component pricing. On the other hand, if rms
integrate then they will employ pure bundling.
In this paper we will exclusively focus on strategic motives behind the integra-
tion decision and as such the model will be stylized to obtain closed-form solutions
and thus provide some useful policy implications. With this aim in mind, we solve
the two-stage game proposed above. As shall shortly be seen, our results can be
3A couple of recent contributions that merit to be cited are Faulí-Oller (2000) and Qiu and
Zhou (2005). These papers focus on the possibility of strategic merger waves.
4There are quite a number of papers devoted to the analysis of integration in complementary
markets but they focus on the question of price equilibria when separate and joint consumption are
possible (as e.g. in Gabszewicz et al., 2001), on foreclosure issues (as e.g. in Church and Gandal,
2000, and Garmon, 2004) or on the interplay between vertical integration, market power and the
incentives to innovate (as e.g. in Heeb, 2003).
Liao and Tauman (2002) review some important references on the literature of bundling.
Whether bundling strategies are allowed is crucial for equilibrium existence. The literature on
bundling has examined its role as a potential price discrimination device, as a facilitating means
to soften competition and as a tool that creates entry barriers. Recent work by Gans and King
(2004) discusses when the economic consequences of bundling should be of concern for competition
authorities.
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intuitively presented by relating the market size ratio and the degree of product dif-
ferentiation between both composite goods. In this setting, we show that integration
is protable for a high enough degree of product di¤erentiation, and that consumer
surplus need not necessarily increase when rms integrate despite the fact that prices
of composite goods diminish. Furthermore, the equilibrium structure can result in a
prisoners dilemma; rms would earn higher prots had they not integrated. We also
nd the interesting result that, if integration occurs then the prots of rival rms,
whether integrated or not, always decrease which is in contrast to earlier ndings.
Indeed one must resort to introduce sequentiality in the merger decision or assume
cost heterogeneity to possibly have outsiders harmed by a merger. Concerning the
welfare analysis, a conict may arise because privately protable integration will
occur under conditions where higher welfare would be attained without any inte-
gration at all. Essentially, (pure) bundling need not be anti-competitive if linked to
an integration process as both a su¢ cient degree of product di¤erentiation together
with a low enough market size asymmetry ensure an equilibrium with integration
that is privately and socially desirable.
These results basically remain valid under a number of extensions: mixed bundling,
compatibility and competition from another system. However, there are some dis-
parities that convey di¤erent policy recommendations. In particular, under mixed
bundling, a single integration process has positive e¤ects for consumers both in the
systems and in the components markets but parallel integration of both systems is
always welfare reducing. Compatibility of components improves upon the situation
under incompatibility both from a private and a social point of view. Finally, when
there is a third competing system, privately protable integration requires softer
conditions in terms of the degree of product di¤erentiation and therefore integration
processes are more likely to arise in equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model presenting the
private protability analysis and the equilibrium on the integration decision. Some
welfare considerations and the corresponding policy implications are discussed in
Section 3 and three possible extensions of the basic model are examined in Section
4. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
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2 Model and Private Protability
Suppose that there are two di¤erentiated brands of each of two components, A and
B, so that there are four rms. Let us assume that marginal costs of production are
zero. Di¤erentiated brand A1 has to be combined with di¤erentiated brand B1 to
form system 1. Similarly, A2 combined with B2 form system 2. Both systems are
partially substitutes for one another and, for the sake of the exposition, no other
combinations are allowed.5 We will assume that demand functions for systems 1
and 2 are linear as follows,
Q1 =   b(pA1 + pB1) + d(pA2 + pB2) and (1)
Q2 =    b(pA2 + pB2) + d(pA1 + pB1),
where Qi represents the demand for system i, for i = 1; 2; ;  stand for system-
specic market size; pAi + pBi denotes the (total) price of system i, for i = 1; 2; b; d
are positive and b > d: This demand system for di¤erentiated products follows from
solving the optimization problem of a representative consumer with a quasi-linear
utility function à la Dixit; it reects that systems are less di¤erentiated as d tends to
b. Furthermore, systems are potentially asymmetric in the sense of di¤erent market
sizes and, for the sake of the exposition, we assume that   .6
There are three scenarios to be analyzed. We begin by characterizing the in-
dependent ownership (I) scenario when the four rms choose simultaneously and
non-cooperatively their respective prot-maximizing prices; this entails pure com-
ponent pricing. The prot functions are A1 = pA1Q1, B1 = pB1Q1, A2 = pA2Q2,
and B2 = pB2Q2. The equilibrium prices are given by,
pIA1 = p
I
B1 =
3b + 2d
9b2   4d2 ; p
I
A2 = p
I
B2 =
3b + 2d
9b2   4d2 . (2)
5This assumption is justied when demands for hybrid composites A1B2 and A2B1 are small
compared to own-product demands A1B1 and A2B2, in which case a rm does not want compati-
bility. Nevertheless, the possibility of compatibility and how results are modied is contemplated
in the extensions section.
6In line with most of the literature, we will refer to the demand intercepts as the respective
market sizes. Note that some authors consider these as parameters that measure some vertical
characteristic such as the quality of the product. We will stick to the former concept to avoid any
confusion. Indeed, following Dixit (1979), the ratio  would reect absolute advantage in demand
whereas db would stand for the cross-price e¤ect. In our case, both these ratios range between 0
and 1:
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Equilibrium outputs and prots are the following,
QI1 =
b (3b + 2d)
9b2   4d2 = bp
I
A1; Q
I
2 =
b (3b + 2d)
9b2   4d2 = bp
I
A2; (3)
IA1 = 
I
B1 = b
 
pIA1
2
; IA2 = 
I
B2 = b
 
pIA2
2
: (4)
Notice that prices (and therefore quantities and prots) are increasing with both
market sizes, but quite naturally the e¤ect of own market size is stronger.
The second scenario corresponds with the case of merger of the two rms pro-
ducing components A1 and B1, which is a situation of single complementary inte-
gration. For the sake of the exposition it will be referred to as single integration
(S). These two rms set the price of system 1 cooperatively, denoted by p1, while
competition remains in setting the price of components for system 2. This means
that there is pure bundling in system 1 and pure component pricing in system 2.
Therefore, demand functions take now the form: Q1 =    bp1 + d(pA2 + pB2)
and Q2 =    b(pA2 + pB2) + dp1. The prot functions are given by 1 = p1Q1,
A2 = pA2Q2, and B2 = pB2Q2, where it is assumed that prots are shared
equally when two rms integrate. Solving the system formed by @1=@p1 = 0,
@A2=@pA2 = 0 and @B2=@pB2 = 0 yields the following equilibrium prices,
pS1 =
3b + 2d
2(3b2   d2) ; p
S
A2 = p
S
B2 =
2b + d
2(3b2   d2) . (5)
The remaining equilibrium variables are,
QS1 =
b (3b + 2d)
2(3b2   d2) = bp
S
1 ; Q
S
2 =
b (2b + d)
2(3b2   d2) = bp
S
A2; (6)
S1 = b
 
pS1
2
; SA2 = 
S
B2 = b
 
pSA2
2
: (7)
The next result follows directly by comparing the single integration situation
vis-à-vis the independent ownership solution. With no loss of generality, we will
look at the case of integration of producers of system 1 (the computations in case
of integration of producers of system 2 are similar and follow straightforwardly).
Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The move from independent ownership to single integration implies:
i) The price pS1 is lower than that under independent ownership p
I
A1 + p
I
B1.
ii) Prots of the integrated rms are higher than before for 0 < d
b
< 0:66.
iii) The prices and prots of the non-integrated rms are lower.
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The above results partially conrm Cournots (1838) model of complementary
duopoly. Cournot considered the merger of two monopolists that produce comple-
mentary goods (zinc and copper) into a single (fused) monopolist that produces the
combination of them (brass). The price of the composite good after merger is lower
than under independent ownership because the integration of rms that o¤er com-
plementary components internalizes the externality that arises when they set prices
independently thus ignoring the e¤ects on their individual markups. If there were
no competition from a substitute composite good, then integration would always
turn out protable - as in Cournots example. However, the presence of the two
non integrated rms unveils that single integration will only be protable whenever
competition is not too intense. Values of b far from values of d (low d
b
) imply that
product di¤erentiation is strong and hence competition intensity is low; the di¤er-
ence in prices is smaller for smaller values of d. Then, although prices go down the
increase in output is such that prots under single integration situation are higher.
Strategic complementarity pushes prices of rival rms down and consequently their
prots.
Finally, the third scenario is the case of parallel (complementary) integration
(P), i.e. rms that produce Ai and Bi integrate so that now there is bundle-against-
bundle competition. That is, we wish to address whether it is always strategically
optimal for the non-integrated rms to cooperate in setting the price, p2, for system
2 provided that the rivals have integrated. Demands are now Q1 =    bp1 + dp2
and Q2 =    bp2 + dp1 and the corresponding equilibrium prices are given by,
pP1 =
2b + d
4b2   d2 ; p
P
2 =
2b + d
4b2   d2 ; (8)
which yield the following equilibrium outputs and prots,
QP1 =
b (2b + d)
4b2   d2 = bp
P
1 ; Q
P
2 =
b (2b + d)
4b2   d2 = bp
P
2 ; (9)
P1 = b
 
pP1
2
; P2 = b
 
pP2
2
. (10)
Their comparison with single integration leads to the next result.
Lemma 2 The move from single to parallel integration implies:
i) The price pP2 is lower than that under single integration p
S
A2 + p
S
B2.
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ii) Prots of the former non integrated rms are now higher for 0 < d
b
< 0:77.
iii) Furthermore, pP1 is also lower than p
S
1 and prots of the former integrated rms
decrease.
Again, the integration of rms providing complementary components drives
prices down. Not only the price set by the newly integrated rms decreases but
also that of the rival, due to strategic complementarity of prices. It then follows
that, as illustrated in Lemma 1, integration is disadvantageous for rivals no matter
prices are set cooperatively (as in scenario P) or non cooperatively (as in scenario
S). The intuition for rms producing system 2 to strategically integrate is the same
as before. The price decrease is lower the higher the degree of product di¤eren-
tiation. Consequently, low values of the ratio d
b
make it such that integration is
protable despite the loss associated with lower prices. It is also worth mentioning
that a setting with parallel integration leads to lower prices and higher total output.
The foregoing analysis suggests that integration is protable only under some
circumstances. The comparison of the above prots in the three considered scenarios
allows us to characterize the equilibrium on the integration decision (rst-stage
equilibrium). The next proposition follows in a straightforward manner from the
above results.
Proposition 1 Given Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium on the integration decision
is:
i) No integration (independent ownership) will occur in equilibrium for d
b
2 (0:77; 1).
ii) Parallel integration takes place in equilibrium for d
b
2 (0; 0:66].
iii) Both independent ownership and parallel integration are equilibria for d
b
2 (0:66; 0:77].
The degree of product di¤erentiation indicates how intense competition is in the
market. We conclude that a setting with parallel integration arises when competition
intensity is low whereas independent ownership occurs in equilibrium when compe-
tition intensity is tough. It is interesting to note that market sizes do not inuence
the decision to integrate. However, these are relevant for equilibrium price di¤er-
ences, and hence equilibrium prot levels, within a particular scenario; equilibrium
price di¤erences increase as systems become more di¤erentiated. In fact, for given
 and ; the price di¤erence under independent ownerswhip is greater than under
parallel integration. Thus, it seems that parallel integration leads to a reduction in
8
the asymmetry between systems. As the analysis below shows, asymmetric market
sizes do play a role when evaluating potential consumersgains and consequently the
welfare e¤ects of integration processes. It is also worth mentioning that although
asymmetric equilibria are possible, single integration is not an equilibrium in our
demand-based setting. This suggests that some cost structure (e.g. economies of
scope, xed costs and the like) should be introduced in the model if we searched for
a theoretical explanation to some observed behavior in certain industries.
Furthermore, part ii) of the above proposition can be qualied since it may lead
to a prisonersdilemma situation whenever product di¤erentiation across systems is
not very tough.
Corollary 1 Whenever parallel integration arises:
i) Firms producing system 1 are better o¤ than under independent ownership for low
values of d
b
combined with low values of 

.
ii) Firms producing system 2 are better o¤ than under independent ownership for
low values of d
b
combined with high values of 

.
Figure 1 below species all possible outcomes:
Figure 1: Prots
Therefore, depending on the values of d
b
and 

, it may occur that all rms end up
better o¤ (region 1, where P1 > 
I
A1+
I
B1 and 
P
2 > 
I
A2+
I
B2); all worse o¤ (region
9
3); only partners producing system 1 improve (region 2). We say that integration is
"protable per se" when all rms end up better o¤with respect to independent own-
ership (region 1). Thus, region 2 captures situations where only single integration is
protable but, since systems are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, integration is a dominant
strategy. In order to improve with respect to independent ownership, rms require
a high enough degree of product di¤erentiation (integration processes have to be
privately protable) and a minimum absolute demand advantage, i.e. 

su¢ ciently
low for A1 and B1 (regions 1 and 2) and 

su¢ ciently high for A2 and B2 (region
1). Market size asymmetry favoring partners producing system 1 explains the larger
parameter space in which they end up better o¤.
For very high values of d
b
, rms end up worse o¤ giving rise to a prisoners
dilemma situation where absolute demand advantage does not play any role. Finally,
one can check that when 

! 1, either all rms improve or all them worsen (region
2 disappears).
3 Welfare Considerations and Policy Implications
Consumer surplus in each of the three considered scenarios is given by:
CSI =
b[(9b2 + 4d2)(2 + 2) + 24bd]
2 (9b2   4d2)2 ; CS
S =
b[(9b2 + d2)2 + 16bd + 4(b2 + d2)2]
8 (3b2   d2)2
(11)
and CSP =
b[(4b2 + d2) (2 + 2) + 8bd]
2 (4b2   d2)2 . (12)
Lemma 3 Single integration is benecial for consumers when it is privately prof-
itable. However, the integration of the remaining system enhances consumer surplus
only under certain circumstances. In any case, whenever parallel integration arises
in equilibrium, consumers are better o¤ than under independent ownership.
It is easy to check that CSS exceeds CSI when single integration is privately
protable regardless of the degree of product di¤erentiation and absolute demand
advantage.7
7In fact, this statement also holds for  < , i.e. independently of whether the integrating
system is the one with larger or smaller market size.
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Although the comparison between CSP and CSS requires some qualications
(see Appendix), CSP > CSI is always the case under a parallel integration equilib-
rium.
In this framework, it is interesting to compute the total welfare to examine possi-
ble policy implications by taking into account both private protability of rms and
consumers welfare. As usual, total welfare is dened by the sum of consumer surplus
and industry prots, and is denoted by W P , W S and W I , for each corresponding
scenario.
Proposition 2 Complementary integration of a system is welfare-improving for suf-
ciently low values of d
b
combined with a minimum absolute demand advantage.
Figure 2 below displays all the possible situations:
Figure 2: Welfare
In region 1, any integration decision is welfare-improving and therefore socially
desirable (W S > W I and W P > W S). The opposite occurs in region 3 where
integration is welfare-harming, that is, independent ownership yields the highest
welfare. In region 2, only the move from independent ownership to single integration
induces a better social outcome, i.e. the integration of the rms producing the
system with an absolute demand advantage.
As a consequence of this analysis, a major guideline for regulation of comple-
mentary integration processes in duopolistic markets can be drawn up. Parallel
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integration decisions should be allowed in region 1, i.e. when products are strongly
di¤erentiated (so that competition should not be too intense) and market size asym-
metry across systems is not too large. On the other hand, if the latter is important
and systems are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (region 2), then competition authorities
should only favor single integration of the system with an absolute demand advan-
tage.
There are cases for which i) integration processes that are welfare-reducing arise
in equilibrium; ii) and some integration processes that are welfare-benecial are not
carried out.
In fact, parallel integration may be the equilibrium of the two-stage game played
by rms (it is su¢ cient that d
b
< 0:66) and yet social welfare be higher under single
integration. Note for instance the case when there is a large enough degree of product
di¤erentiation and a large market size asymmetry. Then parallel integration is the
equilibrium but welfare is the highest with single integration, which brings us to the
controversial question of whether antitrust authorities should "correct" for wrong
rmsdecisions.
On the other hand, independent ownership is one of the equilibrium structures
for d
b
2 (0:66; 0:77] and welfare is typically higher under single integration. As is
obvious from inspection of Figures 1 and 2 above, by simply overlaying both gures,
private and social incentives to integrate can run in opposite directions.
Furthermore, as must have been noted already, integration also entails a change
in the pricing strategy of the integrated rms that now engage in pure bundling.
Our analysis then puts forward that pure bundling need not be necessarily anti-
competitive because parallel integration can be both privately protable and socially
desirable.
4 Some Extensions
We elaborate next on some extensions to investigate in more detail whether the
main foregoing conclusions about endogenous integration of complementary prod-
ucts continue to hold.8
8The computations are available from the authors upon request.
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Mixed bundling.
The model that we have developed above has assumed that rms that integrate
engage in pure bundling. In other words, integration also entails a change in their
pricing strategy. Suppose then that, once integration occurs, the integrated rm can
sell each product separately as well as the bundle or composite good. In this case,
the integrated rm would practise mixed bundling. Hence, we have to distinguish
between the market for the components (monopolies) and the market for systems
(duopoly). We keep on assuming potentially di¤erent market sizes for the two system
producers.9 Now integration enables partner rms to price-discriminate consumers
willing to buy just separate components from those interested in the composite good
by pricing separately and independently the integrated good. Under independent
ownership, the price for the systems are just the sum of the prices of components and
integration processes allow to o¤er a lower price to consumers buying the system.
When integration occurs, the integrated rms must ensure an equilibrium price
lower than the sum of the equilibrium prices of the separate components but higher
than the equilibrium price of just one of the components; these guarantee that
the composite good (the bundle) and the separate components both have positive
demand.10
Though computations are rather more elaborate, the main results regarding the
market for systems remain valid and, from the point of view of private protability,
the only disparity is that the multiple equilibria case that appeared in the previous
sections disappears. That is, part iii) of Proposition 1 does not show up and parallel
integration arises for enough product di¤erentiation whereas independent ownership
is the equilibrium for little product di¤erentiation. Additionally, prots of outsiders
9More precisely, demand functions for separate components are given by qA1 =    bpA1,
qB1 =  bpB1, qA2 =  bpA2, qB2 =  bpB2; whereas in the case of systems they take the form
specied in equation (1). We assume that market sizes are the same both for the components and
the systems demands. It must however be noted that the analysis is consistent (i.e. equilibrium
prices suppose positive demands in all the scenarios) as long as these market sizes do not di¤er
much.
10In this framework, one must take into account the so called non-arbitrage conditions ensuring
the separability between component and system markets. These conditions take the form pS1 >
pSA1; p
S
B1 and p
S
1 < p
S
A1+p
S
B1 in the single integration framework; and p
P
1 > p
P
A1; p
P
B1; p
P
2 > p
P
A2; p
P
B2;
pP1 < p
P
A1 + p
P
B1and p
P
1 < p
P
A1 + p
P
B1 in the parallel integration framework.
Compliance with non-arbitrage conditions determine a subset in (db ;

 ) where results are com-
parable under the three considered scenarios.
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decrease and prices of composite goods go down once integration occurs. It is also
the case that a prisoners dilemma arises. Furthermore, by comparing equilibrium
prots under pure and mixed bundling, we observe that rms are typically better o¤
under mixed bundling since they can as well exploit the markets for the individual
components.
As for the potential anti-competitive e¤ects of mixed bundling, the main results
are a¤ected by the interaction between the markets for components and the market
for systems. More precisely our analysis unveils that, although single integration is
socially desirable when integration is privately protable, parallel integration (which
can be indeed the equilibrium outcome of the proposed two-stage game) always
induces a worse social outcome. This is explained by the fact that a single integration
process entails a decrease in the prices of the non-integrated rms (as pointed out
in Lemma 1), and this e¤ect concerns both the components (i.e. pSA2 and p
S
B2) and
the system market (i.e. pSA2+p
S
B2). Nevertheless, when a parallel integration process
takes place, the mentioned e¤ect over the prices of the previously integrated rms (as
pointed out in Lemma 2) only a¤ects the system market (i.e. pP1 ), having no e¤ect
on the components markets (i.e. pPA1 and p
P
B1) that are now priced independently.
Therefore, the positive e¤ect for consumers that a single integration process had
over the components market vanishes in the case of a parallel integration process,
turning it into welfare harming.
Consequently, the policy recommendations in a duopolistic market for systems
where components are also sold separately, would be that a single integration process
should be permitted but not a parallel integration of both systems. This situation
raises a dilemma for competition authorities that have to determine which of the two
possible integration processes has to be allowed. In such a framework, transparency
of policy procedures becomes especially relevant.
Compatibility.
Thus far we have been assuming that only two systems (systems 1 and 2) were
possible since combinations A1+B2 or B1+A2 reported no utility to consumers and
therefore had no demand. Under compatibility we would have four possible systems.
Consistently with the above analysis, we assume that "hybrid" systems (systems 12
and 21) are characterized by a market size that is the average of the market size of
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its components.11 For tractability reasons, we consider that the degree of product
di¤erentiation between any pair of systems is the same.12 In this framework, there
exists a unilateral incentive to integrate which makes independent ownership not to
arise at equilibrium. Besides, parallel integration (either system 1 or system 2) is
typically the equilibrium of the proposed two-stage game. As in the main model,
it is also the case that non-integrating rms (outsiders) are almost always harmed
by an integration decision. To be more precise, outsiders can only prot from inte-
gration of other systems when product di¤erentiation is strong and there is a high
enough absolute demand advantage of the integrating system. As for the welfare
and policy implications, the considerations made under incompatible systems stand
true when systems are composed of compatible products. In our four-rm setting,
product compatibility improves upon the situation under incompatibility both from
a private and a social point of view when compatibility is enforceable and has no
implementation costs, just as in the the two-rm setting depicted in Matutes and
Regibeau (1988). This result is mainly explained by the fact that product compat-
ibility increases the number of systems from which consumers can choose.
Competition from another system.
Now suppose that there are two more rms, one producing component A3 and
another one producing component B3 so that, when combined, system (composite
good) 3 is formed: One wonders whether the main results of the model are robust to
the introduction of more competition.13 By solving the proposed two-stage game we
11Specically, Q1 =    b(pA1 + pB1) + d(pA1 + pB2) + e(pA2 + pB1) + f(pA2 + pB2), Q2 =
 b(pA2+pB2)+d(pA2+pB1)+e(pA1+pB2)+f(pA1+pB1), Q12 = +2  b(pA1+pB2)+d(pA1+pB1)+
e(pA2+pB2)+f(pA2+pB1) andQ21 =
+
2  b(pA2+pB1)+d(pA2+pB2)+e(pA1+pB1)+f(pA1+pB2),
where b > d+ e+ f .
12That is, d = e = f . By dening g = 3d, we can measure pairwise di¤erentiation across
systems by gb (that ranges between 0 and 1). It would be equivalent to keeping
d
b as the product
di¤erentiation indicator, knowing that db would range now between 0 and
1
3 .
13Specically, demand functions are assumed as follows: Q1 =   b(pA1+pB1)+d(pA2+pB2)+
e(pA3 + pB3), Q2 =    b(pA2 + pB2) + d(pA1 + pB1) + f(pA3 + pB3) and Q3 =    b(pA3 + pB3) +
e(pA1+pB1)+ f(pA2+pB2), where b > d+ e, b > d+ f and b > e+ f . As we did in the robustness
analysis under compatibility we consider that the degree of product di¤erentiation between any
pair of systems is the same, i.e. d = e = f . Thus, by dening g = 2d, we can measure pairwise
di¤erentiation across systems by gb (that ranges between 0 and 1). In addition, we assume that
 = +2 to have comparable results.
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nd that all the results previously stated stand valid in the case of a triopoly with the
nuance that private protability integration now requires softer conditions in terms
of the degree of product di¤erentiation; in particular, single integration is protable
for a degree of product di¤erentiation below 0:80 (with two systems this value is 0:66)
while that value is 0:87 for parallel integration to be privately protable (it was 0:77).
The same conclusions about prices and that outsiders are harmed by integration
continue to hold. Concerning welfare, similar results and policy implications to
the main model are obtained. The consideration of more competition provides the
following interesting insight. As long as systems competing in the market di¤er from
each other in the same degree, integration processes are more likely to arise when
there are more composite products available for consumers. That is, the range of
values for the degree of product di¤erentiation under which parallel integration is
an equilibrium enlarges when there is a third competing system. The main reason
underlying this rather surprising result is that the di¤erentiated goods model that
we have used has the property that aggregate market size varies with the number
of products. Thus, there is more competition but there also arises a "creation of
demand" e¤ect.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a simple model with complementary goods competition to an-
swer some well-established research questions in the literature as to whether socially
detrimental mergers may occur in equilibrium and whether some socially benecial
mergers may fail to occur. One rationale behind the merging of two rms is that it
can lead to cost savings. The foregoing analysis has assumed away the presence of
any e¢ ciency gains so that one must expect that, because market power increases,
consumers and society at large must be worse o¤. Yet a merger can rationalize
production when there are complementary products involved, as in our setting.
Basically, antitrust merger policy evaluates whether the merging parties can ex-
ercise market power, raise prices and indeed lessen competition. Our setting is a
modest contribution to the analysis of integration between complements, that would
lead to lower prices, when integration entails the use of bundling. Competition au-
thorities are of course concerned with concentration operations but it must also be
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noted that bundling is a marketing tactic that may have anti-competitive e¤ects if
employed e.g. for price discrimination purposes or entry deterrence reasons. The
growth in the so called economics of information as well as many recent antitrust
cases have renewed interest in the economic e¤ects of vertical and complementary
product integration, and bundling.14 The General Electric/Honeywell case precisely
exemplies the issues at stake. But there are other cases, such as ABB/Daimler-
Benz (M.580), T-Online International/TUI/C&N Touristic (M.2149), and Flying-J
et al v. Comdata Network, Inc.15 The economic issues in these cases are not exclu-
sively about integration with complementary products and bundling practises but
certainly these features gure rather prominently and emphasize the interest of the
analysis undertaken.
Despite its simplicity, and with the necessary qualications, several lessons can
be extracted from our study. Firstly, integration of complementary products com-
bined with bundling is not necessarily privately protable in a setting with strategic
interaction. Firms have a unilateral incentive to integrate for a su¢ ciently high
degree of product di¤erentiation. Secondly, a conict may arise between private
and social incentives to integration. It has been shown that rival non-integrating
rms are typically harmed whereas consumer surplus improves when the absolute
demand advantage of the integrating product is su¢ ciently large. Consequently,
integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product
14Specically, concentrations in the European Union are evaluated on the basis of Regulation
4064/89, amended by Council Regulation 139/2004; in the United States the ruling is under the
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, later amended in 1997.
As for bundling, it is a business strategy that allows a seller to sort out consumers of di¤erent
types. Price discrimination in the European Union is ruled under Article 82 of the Treaty while
in the United States it is judged according to Section 2 of the Clayton Act amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act (1936). See Motta (2004) for a treatment of competition policy. Also, the
recent report by Church (2004) provides a detailed review of the literature, which can be used
by antitrust agencies, on vertical and conglomerate mergers and the opportunities these create to
engage in bundling and foreclosure.
15The former two cases are European cases; they include relations of complementary between
rolling stock (rail vehicles) and stationary equipment, and the joint operation of the leading German
internet service provider with tour operators activities, respectively. The latter case is a U.S. case
that is expressly referred by Garmon (2004) to develop a theoretical framework and analyze the
incentive to integrate (and foreclose) by two complementary producers, Comdata, a provider of
eet card services for trucks, and Trendar, a supplier of fuel desk devices for trucks.
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di¤erentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the com-
peting system; otherwise, a conict may arise. Thirdly, and in connection with the
latter conclusion, bundling need not be per se anti-competitive. As catalogued by
Gans and King (2004), bundling can be socially e¢ cient since we have just seen
that there are conditions under which private and social interests coincide. Indeed,
our results abound on some of the arguments given by Nalebu¤ (2002), who ex-
presses his doubts about the potential anti-competitive e¤ects of bundling, specially
in the presence of systems competition. Last but not least, the analysis uncovers
some di¤erent policy implications; such di¤erences depend not only on absolute de-
mand advantages and the degree of product di¤erentiation but also on the type of
bundling, the presence of more competition and the question of compatibility. The
main message is that a parallel integration process can only lead to welfare gains in
rather particular circumstances.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
The price of the integrating system decreases since the di¤erence (pIA1+p
I
B1) pS1
yields 3b
2(3b+2d)
54b4 42b2d2+8d4 , which is clearly positive provided that b > d. Since prices are
strategic complements it follows that pSA2 and p
S
B2 are now lower, and so are prof-
its by the way equilibrium prots are written. Finally, the di¤erence 
S
1
2
  IA1
yields (
b
4
)(3b+2d)2(9b4 24b2d2+8d4)
(9b2 4d2)2(3b2 d2)2: . The sign of this expression is given by the sign of
9b4   24b2d2 + 8d4. Therefore, S1
2
  IA1 is positive for db < 0:66.
Proof of Lemma 2.
The price of the integrating system decreases since the di¤erence (pSA2+p
S
B2) pP2
results in b
2(2b+d)
12b4 7b2d2+d4 , which is positive given that b > d. The di¤erence
P2
2
  SA2
yields (
b
2
)(2b+d)2(2b4 4b2d2+d4)
(4b2 d2)2(3b2 d2)2 . The sign of this expression is given by the sign of
2b4   4b2d2 + d4. Therefore, P2
2
  SA2 is positive for values of db below 0:77.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Straightforward given Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Corollary 1.
The di¤erence P1  (IA1+IB1) yields b(2b+d)
2(9b2 4d2)2 2b(3b+2d)2(d2 4b2)2
(9b2 4d2)2(d2 4b2)2 whose
sign is given by the numerator that is positive for


<
30( d
b
)+48( d
b
)3 20( d
b
)5 p2
p
1296( d
b
)2 1800( d
b
)4+913( d
b
)6 200( d
b
)8+16( d
b
)10
8( d
b
)6 8( d
b
)4 47( d
b
)2
which is the de-
creasing function plotted in Figure 1.
The di¤erence P2  (IA2+IB2) yields b(2b+d)
2(9b2 4d2)2 2b(3b+2d)2(d2 4b2)2
(9b2 4d2)2(d2 4b2)2 whose
sign is given by the numerator that is positive for


>
30( d
b
)+48( d
b
)3 20( d
b
)5 p2
p
1296( d
b
)2 1800( d
b
)4+913( d
b
)6 200( d
b
)8+16( d
b
)10
2(18 72( d
b
)2+23( d
b
)4)
which is the in-
creasing function plotted in Figure 1.
The three di¤erent regions delimited by this two functions are thoroughly com-
mented in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 3.
The di¤erenceCSS CSI yields b(3b+2d)(135b5 165b3d2+44bd4+54b4d 82b2d3+24d5)
8(27b4 21b2d2+4d4)2
whose sign is given by the numerator that is positive for 

<
165( d
b
)2 44( d
b
)4 135
2( d
b
)(27 41( d
b
)2+12( d
b
)4)
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which is always the case when single integration is privately protable (i.e. d
b
< 0:66).
The di¤erence CSP   CSS yields b(d+2b)( 4b4d 9b2d3+3d5+40b5 46b3d2+10bd4)
8(12b4 7b2d2+d4)2
whose sign is given by the numerator that is positive for 

>
4( d
b
)+9( d
b
)3 3( d
b
)5
2(20 23( d
b
)2+5( d
b
)4)
. The
latter inequality is respected for su¢ ciently low values of d
b
combined with su¢ ciently
high values of 

.
CSP CSI yields b((180b6 199b4d2+15b2d4+12d6)2+(264b5d 384b3d3+104bd5)+(180b6 199b4d2+15b2d4+12d6)2)
2(9b2 4d2)2(4b2 d2)2
and the sign of this expression is given by the numerator which is always positive
when parallel integration is privately protable (i.e. d
b
< 0:77).
Proof of Proposition 2.
The di¤erenceW S W I yields b(3b+2d)(189b5 393b3d2+124bd4 54b4d 122b2d3+56d5)
8(27b4 21b2d2+4d4)2
whose sign is given by the numerator that is positive for 

<
393( d
b
)2 124( d
b
)4 189
2d(28( d
b
)4 61( d
b
)2 27) which
is the decreasing function plotted in Figure 2.
The di¤erence W P  W S yields b(d+2b)( 44b4d 11b2d3+7d5+56b5 106b3d2+26bd4)
8(12b4 7b2d2+d4)2
whose sign is given by the numerator that is positive for 

>
44( d
b
)+11( d
b
)3 7( d
b
)5
2(28 53( d
b
)2+13( d
b
)4)
which
is the increasing function plotted in Figure 2.
The three di¤erent regions delimited by this two functions are thoroughly com-
mented in the main text.
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